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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
W. R. EDDINGTON, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
vs. 
WILLIAM R. CLYDE, 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent herein filed an action against the appel-
lant and Eddington Canning Company, a corporation, where-
in the complaint was set forth in two counts. Count No. 
1 was an action against Eddington Canning Company, Inc., 
a corporation, on an account for produce sold and dlivered. 
Count No.2 was an action against appellant, W. R. Edding-
ton, personally, based upon an alleged guarantee puryor-
ted to have been given by defendant, W. R. Eddington, to 
the plaintiff, guaranteeing to the plaintiff payment of the 
account by Eddington Canning Company, Inc., a corpora-
tion. The appellant denied ever having made a personal 
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2 
guarantee to the plaintiff. Motions for summary judgment 
were made by the plaintiff against the defendant, Edding-
ton Canning Company, Inc., a corporation, and against the 
defendant, W. R. Eddington. A motion for summary judg-
ment was made by the defendant, W. R. Eddington, against 
the plaintiff. 
The documents upon which the plaintiff relies to con-
stitute a guarantee on the part of the appellant (Plaintiff's 
E:mibit "1") is set out as follows, including the letterhead: 
''Eddington Canning Company, Inc. 
Phone HJU 9-5611 Springville, Utah 
March 6, 1957 
Mr. William Clyde 
Springville, Utah 
Dear Bill: 
This is to certify that I, personally, will guarantee you 
payment for any tomatoes you raise and deliver for us, 
or any other crop contracted for, on the day contract spe-
cifies for payment. 
WRE/n" 
Very truly yours, 
EDDINGTON CANNING COMPANY 
/s/ W. R. Eddington 
W. R. Eddington 
In support of the motion for summary judgment made 
on behalf of appellant an affidavit was filed (Tr. 39) signed 
by the appellant wherein it was stated that appellant, by 
signing the foregoing Exhibit 1, signed said exhibit in his 
capacity as president of said co~poration and signed for the 
said corporation and that the appellant intended to bind 
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only the assets of the corporation to secure any obligation 
due to the plaintiff; that appellant did not intend to bind 
his personal assets to secure any obligation owed by the 
canning company to the plaintiff. 
The Court granted the motion for summary judgment 
against the appellant and in favor of the plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT "1" IS A GUARANTEE BY 
EDDINGTON CANNING COMPANY TO TilE PLAIN-
TIFF AND AS A MATTER OF LAW IS NOT A GUAR-
ANTEE OF APPELLANT, W. R. EIDDINGTON, T\) PAY 
PLAINTIFF IF THE CORPORATION FAILED TO PAY. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MO-
TION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT "1" IS A GUARANTEE BY 
EDDINGTON CANNING COMPANY TO THE PLAIN-
TIFF AND AS A MATTER OF LAW IS NOT A GUAR-
ANTEE OF APPELLANT, W. R. EDDINGTON, TO PAY 
PLAINTIFF IF THE CORPORATION FAILED TO PAY. 
This appeal involves only one point of law and that 
is whether or not as a matter of law the appellant is bound 
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as a guarantor by reason of Plaintiff's Exhibit "1". It will 
be noted that Plaintiff's Exhi!bi.t "1" is written upon the 
corporate stationery which bears a corporate letterhead 
and that the letter is signed "Eddington Canning Company, 
W. R. Eddington." The rule is stated in 13 Am. Jur. Page 
994 as follows: 
"In determining whether a corporate director, officer 
or agent is liable upon a corporate contract, the par-
tiJCular form of the promise in, or signature to, such 
contract is of prime importance in deducing the in-
tention in such respect with which the contract was 
executed. A correct form of signature which is uni-
formly regarded as imposing no personal liability upon 
the officer signing is that of a signature containing 
the corporate name, followed by the words 'per' or 
~by" which, in tum, is followed by the name of a cor-
porate officer. When the word 'per' or 'by' is followed 
by the name of more than one officer, however, the 
case is not so clear." 
Two cases have been found that are almost on all 
fours with the present case and which cases are still the 
law in their particular states. The first case is St. Joseph 
Valley Bank v. Napoleon Motors Company, et al. (Mich.) 
202 N. W. 933. In this case the defendant, Napoleon Mo-
tors Company, a co~tion, manufactured trucks. Frank 
Trude was the vice-president and W. G. Rath, its secretary 
and treasurer. In selling trucks it received notes secured 
by chattel mortgages. It entered into a contract with the 
plaintiff bank by which plaintiff agreed to and did pur-
chase such paper. The contract provided that, if any of 
the paper was not paid at maturity, defendant corporation 
(therein called the seller) was to pay the same within ten 
days. The agreement was prepared by plaintiff and after 
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signing was sent to Traverse City (resident of the defend-
ant) for form of guaranty, also written thereon, to be 
signed. The guaranty and the signatures were as follows: 
"Full performance of seller's obligations under this con-
tract is individually guaranteed by the following per-
sons: Napoleon Motors Company, Frank Trude, Vice 
Pres., W. G. Rath, Secy.-Treas." 
The notes not being paid as required, plaintiff sued de-
fendant corporation and Trude and Rath, and had judg-
ment in a cause tried without a jury. Trude and Rath ap-
pealed and the question was whether they were personally 
liable as guarantors. 
The Court stated, Page 934: 
"The right of the corporation to sign the guaranty is 
not questioned. It is said that thi:s is an Indiana con-
tract, to be governed by the laws of that statej. We 
think it unnecessary to determine that question, find-
ing the later decisions of the courts of last resort of 
that state, so far as applicable, to be in line with the 
weight of authority, by which the question will be de-
termined. There is a lack of harmony among the au-
thorities on the question. This is recognized in Second 
National Bank v. Midland Steel Co., 155 Ind. 581, 58 
N. E. 833, 52 L.R.A. 307, whre earlier decisions of that 
state are reviewed. 
"If the guaranty had been signed by "Frank Trude, Vice 
Pres.," and "W. G. Rath, Secy.-Treas.," and without-
the name of the corporation, then, considering the 
language of the guaranty, particularly "persons" and 
"individually," it might be held, under many authori-
ties, that the signers were bound personally, and that 
the words "Vice Pres." and "Secy.-Treas." were mere--
ly descriptio personae. Second National Bank v. Mid-
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land Steel Co., supra; Reever v. First Nat. Bank of 
Glassboro, 54 N. J. Law, 208, 23 A. 953, 16 L.R.A. 143, 
33 Am. St. Rep. 675. In many cases somewhat similar 
to the supposed case, the writing being deemed am-
biguous, evidence to show the intention _of the parties 
has been held admissible. 3 Cook on Corporations (6th 
Ed.) Sec. 724; Second Nat. Bank v. Midland Steel Co., 
supra. 
"(1) But here the corporation alone, Napoleon Motors 
Company, signed the guaranty. It could sign only by 
its officer or officers. We cannot ignore its name so 
written. And without the signing of its officer or offi. 
cers its ·signature would be incomplete. The under-
taking so signed must be taken conclusively to be that 
of th corporation." (Cases Cited) 
"Had the word "by" or "per" or "pro" been used before 
the signature of either or both officers, it would have 
added nothing to the certainty of what is expressed. 
Wright v. Drury Petroleum Corp. (Mich.) 201 N. W. 
484, and cases there cited. The words "persons" and 
"individually" and that the signing added nothing to 
the contract are not important here, for there is but 
one signature on the paper, the signature of the cor-
poration, and hence no ambiguity permitting parol evi-
dence on the question. Liebseher v. Kraus, supra; Falk 
v. Moobs, supra; Williams v. Harris, supra." 
The other case in point is Bankers' Trust Company, 
et al. v. Dockham, et al. (Mass.)) 181 N. E. 174. This is 
a case that involved a covenant not to "become interested 
in the publishing of any directory in the textile field, which 
shall compete for a period of ten years with the present pub-
lications of Davision Publishing Company." This para-
graph concluded: 
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"And Stevens Dockham, LHlan M. Dockham and Wil-
liam Martin, being the principal stockholders in the 
Seller's corporation, do agree to this same condition 
for themselves personally." 
The agreement was signed "1Dockham Publishing Com-
pany by Stevens Dockham, Pres., Lillian M. Dockham, 
Treas.'' 
Subsequently Stevens Dockham began to compete with 
the publications of the plaintiff and this action was filed. 
The trial court found: 
"I find as a matter of law that since it is apparent from 
the contract that Stevens Dockham signed the con-
tract only in his capacity as president of the Dockham 
Publishing Company, which plainly appears from the 
signature on the contract, that he is not bound indi-
vidually by any of the terms of the contract and that 
the agreement not to compete contained in paragraphs 
five and six of the contract are not binding on him in-
dividually." 
The appellant court stated: 
"The contract as executed did not bind Stevens Dock-
ham as an individual." 
See also Anderson v. Davis, 234 S. W. 2d 368; New 
England Electric Company v. Shook (Colorado) 145 P. 
1002. 
It is clear that Exhibit "1" was signed in the only man-
ner in which a corporation may sign, which is through an au-
thorized agent, and in this particular case through the 
president of the corporation; that there can be no personal 
liability on the part of the president by reason of having 
signed such a document. It is further clear from the affi-
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davit of the appellant that if there be any ambiguity in 
Exhibit "1" whereby the court might admit evidence to ex-
plain the ambiguity, that the intent is clearly shown by 
such affidavit (Tr. 39) that appellant did not intend to per-
sonaly bind himself. The affidavit on file of the plaintiff 
(Tr. 41) confirms that the plaintiff had no oral discussions 
with an agent of the appellant but that plaintiff had a dis-
cussion with an agent of the Eddington Canning COmpany, 
Inc., a cooporation, which would not be admissible evidence 
as far as appellant is concerned. 
POINT IT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND IN GRANTING PLAINTIF1F'S MO-
TI:ON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
From what has been said and the law applicable to 
Point No. I it is clear that the trial court erred in failing 
to grant appellant's motion for summary judgment and in 
granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment against 
this appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S. REX LEWIS, for: 
HOWARD & LEWIS, 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
kppellant, W. R. Eddington 
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